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Abstract
Jacques Rancière’s work has offered some insightful and provocative ideas on the nature and meaning of 
democratic politics. Recently, he has suggested that the Occupy movement presents “the most interesting” 
example of what he defi nes as radical democratic politics. Using this observation as a starting point, this paper 
applies Rancière’s ideas to two recent political events that carried within them a strong Indigenous voice—
the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) protests and the Idle No More (INM) movement. Th e argument put 
forward is that both the DAPL protests and the INM represent examples of democratic politics as envisioned 
by Rancière, politics which emerge from a general assumption of equality.
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Résumé
L’œuvre de Jacques Rancière a contribué quelques idées provocantes sur la nature et le sens du régime 
politique démocratique. Ce dernier a récemment postulé que le mouvement Occupy est un des exemples de 
politique démocratique radicale « [des] plus intéressant ». À partir de cette observation, cet article applique 
les idées de Rancière comme grille d’analyse de deux événements politiques récents associée à une forte 
présence Autochtone—les manifestations contre le Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) et le mouvement Idle 
No More (INM). L’argument avancé est que les manifestations contre le DAPL et le INM constituent 
des exemples de politiques démocratiques comme l’envisageait Rancière, soit une politiques issues d’une 
supposition générale d’égalité.
Mots clés : Jacques Rancière, politiques d’égalité, politiques Autochtones, démocratie radicale
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Introduction
In his book titled Red Skin, White Masks, Glen Coulthard (2014, 161) has suggested that Idle No More (INM), 
due to its “sustained, united and coordinated mobilization,” represented a truly signifi cant political event. Idle No 
More not only disrupted Canadian politics, creating a “national stir,” (Coulthard, 2014, 161) but also went past 
the borders of a single state, drawing support from across the globe. Th erefore, at the height of the movement, on 
January 11, 2013, 3000 protesters gathered in Ottawa at Parliament Hill; and at the same time, 265 rallies were 
held across North America, Australia, Europe and Asia (Th e Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014a, 399-400). Such 
support allowed the movement to develop a multitude of demands. Th us, while INM was at its core “a defense of 
Indigenous land and sovereignty,” the movement attracted a variety of voices with a multitude of interests (Th e 
Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014b, 22-23): these ranged from environmental concerns (Idle No More 2013a) to 
demands for better healthcare (Idle No More 2013b).
Th e scope and intensity of INM have allowed Coulthard to claim that the events of INM can pave the 
way for other similar organized resistances. And indeed, in the years following INM, there has been an upsurge 
of protests directed primarily towards the construction of oil and gas pipelines, such as Keystone XL and 
Enbridge, or more recently, the Dakota Access Pipeline. Th e North Dakota protests seemed, due to their level of 
mobilization, to resemble the most characteristics of INM. Th e protests managed to gather the support of 300 
Indigenous tribes, as well as that of non-Indigenous groups, who protested in 300 cities around the globe during 
a similar International day of action (Carasik 2016). Both INM and the North Dakota protests represented 
therefore, due to their size and international scope as well as their capacity to draw together Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous people, quite unique political events.
Movements and protests such as the one above, albeit very interesting from a political perspective, do 
not easily fi t common political categories. For example, it is not entirely clear why, although having a strong 
Indigenous character, and being ignited by the wrongs of colonialism, movements like INM transcended the 
borders of a single state, drawing non-Indigenous participants and encompassing a multitude of demands. 
How, therefore, can these political situations be understood? What allowed these movements to become 
something signifi cant politically and to spread throughout Canada and then internationally?  Furthermore, 
if these movements are to be linked with ideas of democracy—as they often have been—then where exactly 
does their democratic character lie? Do they represent expressions of democracy or do they create challenges 
for democracy?  Finally, what insights can be drawn from the aftermath of a movement? What exactly is its 
political potential? 
For such a purpose, this paper will make use of Jacques Rancière’s insightful and provocative ideas on the 
nature and meaning of democratic politics. Rancière (2012) has not written anything specifi cally on Indigenous 
politics, however, he has recently suggested that the Occupy events (which just like INM, took on the label of 
a ‘movement’), present “the most interesting” example of what he defi nes as radical democratic politics.  Given 
this context, this paper aims to suggest that both the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) protests and the INM 
movement, represent examples of democratic politics as envisioned by Rancière, politics which emerged from 
a general assumption of equality. To discuss this hypothesis, the paper will develop as follows: the fi rst section 
will present a theoretical overview of  Rancière’s political thought. In the second section, the paper will discuss 
how INM and the events at Standing Rock can be understood, to one degree or another, through Rancière’s 
conception of democratic politics. Finally, the paper will conclude by briefl y discussing the potential of Rancière’s 
theory for the study of contemporary political movements. 
Rancièrean Politics 
Rancière’s conception of politics departs from conventional understandings. Th e politics that Rancière proposes 
deals with equality. More specifi cally, it deals with how we can act upon this equality in order to put into 
question the mechanisms established by what has been traditionally identifi ed as ’politics.’  Th us, politics, as 
envisioned by Rancière (1999, 17), “happens very little or rarely” more specifi cally, it only occurs “when these 
mechanisms [to be described below] are stopped in their tracks by the eff ect of a presupposition that is totally 
foreign to them yet without which none of them could ultimately function: the presupposition of the equality 
of anyone and everyone.” 
Rancière writes that equality is an empty freedom that everyone possesses. Th is means that there is no 
particular quality that one needs to hold or acquire in order to be equal to everyone else. However, this does 
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not imply that equality is entirely devoid of content. Rancière discusses a certain equality of intelligence. In Th e 
Ignorant Schoolmaster, Rancière presents the story of Joseph Jacotot, who is forced to fl ee post-Revolutionary 
France, and who, as a result, ends up living in Flanders. Jacotot, who can only communicate in French, takes 
a job as a teacher and is immediately faced with the conundrum of trying to teach to a group of students who 
only know Flemish. Using a dual-language edition of Telemachus as his only tool for navigating the language 
divide, Jacotot assigns to his students a paper to be written in French on a topic related to Telemachus. And to his 
surprise, Jacotot fi nds that the students’ papers were excellently written.  From this, Jacotot draws the conclusion 
that the students (and thus people in general) were of equal intelligence; the diff erence in performance was 
given from an inability to attend classes rather than intellectual criteria. Th is story allows Rancière (1991, 39) 
to argue that “[w]hat stultifi es the common people is not the lack of instruction, but the belief in the inferiority 
of their intelligence.” 
Th e assumption of a certain equality of intelligence need not be very sophisticated. It does not mean that 
each and everyone of us is able to write a dissertation and obtain a doctoral degree; rather—and as far as politics 
is concerned—it means that everyone is able to think and act upon the world in such a way that they can 
infl uence it positively (May 2008, 57). While our social and political contexts might at times seem diffi  cult and 
complex, they nevertheless do not require a special skill set since they are within everyone’s intellectual grasp. 
Th e presupposition of equality, then, represents the very possibility of politics. “[O]ur problem,” Rancière (1991, 
46) writes, “isn’t proving that all intelligence is equal. It’s seeing what can be done under that presupposition.”
To better understand the diff erence between politics of equality (or what will be identifi ed as democratic 
politics) and conventional politics, Rancière introduces the concept of the police. Here it might be helpful to note 
that Rancière utilizes a process that can be identifi ed as “re-defi nition.” Th at is, he starts with concepts that his 
readers have a clear sense of, and then he unexpectedly renames these phenomena—a conceptual move that has 
important consequences for his theory of politics (Chambers 2014, 57). Th erefore, Rancière (1999, 28) remarks 
that “[p]olitics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities 
is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing 
this distribution.” He “propose[s] to give this system of distribution and legitimization another name. [He] 
propose[s] to call it the police.” Rancière (1999, 28) agrees that presented in such a way, the term “police” “no 
doubt poses a few problems”, and this is because we typically take “police” to refer to uniformed offi  cers, to patrol 
cars, and to “the truncheon blows of the forces of law and order.” However, police should clearly be understood 
to mean more than a state apparatus put in place to maintain the social order. Police in its military form—or 
the “petty police” —is for Rancière only a particular form within the system of distribution and legitimization 
that he broadly identifi es as the police (Rancière 1999, 28). Th is particular form of police, becomes necessary 
only when the general police order has somehow been threatened or called into question (Chambers 2014, 62).
Th e concept is similar to that of Foucault. For Foucault—who located the origin of the term policing in 
the seventeen century—the police is a mechanism that works to regulate the lives of its citizens so that it can 
foster the well-being of the state. Th e police is a matter of what Foucault (2004, 347) calls “governmentality,” 
the practice of governing; thus “[t]he police is governmentality directed by the sovereign insofar as he is 
sovereign.” Both Foucault and Ranciere therefore link the police with ideas of social ordering that go beyond 
any representations of bodies in uniform. However, for Rancière, the police extends beyond governmentality 
and state rationality to include the rules that inform the organization (i.e. the dividing up and distribution of 
the various parts) of the political community (Chambers 2014, 61). Th at is why “[p]olicing is not so much the 
“disciplining” of bodies as a rule governing their appearing, a confi guration of occupations and the properties of 
the spaces where these occupations are distributed” (Rancière 1999, 29). As such, the police can be understood 
as the mechanism that establishes the organization of society through the dividing up and distribution of the 
various parts that make up the social whole (Chambers 2014, 61). Furthermore, it is important to highlight that 
this confi guration (or partition), aims to control not only the space of the community, but also our perception of 
ourselves, one another, and our world. Seen from this perspective, the police, according to Rancière, represents 
a particular partage du sensible [partition of the sensible], since it is an order of distribution and correspondence 
that works equally eff ectively as a principle of organization for sense perception (Panagia 2014, 97).
Rancière is here once again indebted to Foucault’s work. Foucault’s archeological method sought to uncover 
how the order of things was dependent on the confi guration of the visible and the sayable, that is, on what one 
can see and not see, hear or not hear, and understand either as noise or as discourse. Similar to Foucault’s 
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conception then, the partition of the sensible represents the ways in which the forms of inclusion and exclusion 
that defi ne participation in a community are fi rst and foremost confi gured within our sense experience of the 
world (Palmieri 2002, 34). Th at is why, as Rancière (2010, 36) writes, “society… is made up of groups tied to 
specifi c modes of doing, to places in which these occupations are exercised, and to modes of being corresponding 
to these occupations and these places. In this matching of functions, places and ways of being, there is no 
place for any void. It is this exclusion of what ‘is not’ that constitutes the police-principle at the core of statist 
practices.” From this perspective, politics for Rancière begins when there is a contestation directed at a particular 
partition of the sensible. While the police aims to bring consensus in a society through the establishment of a 
partition of the sensible, democratic politics attempts to achieve the opposite—that is dissensus. As Rancière 
(2001, 36) explains: “[d]issensus is not the confrontation between interests or opinions. It is the manifestation 
of a distance of the sensible from itself.” Th us “[d]issensus is the essence of politics.” 
It can be easily understood why, from such a perspective, much of what passes as politics, represents in fact, 
for Rancière, the police. Th e concept of police is something that is in many respects, antagonistic to politics. In 
an important paragraph, Rancière (1999, 29-30) writes that:
I now propose to reserve the term politics for an extremely determined activity antagonistic to 
policing: whatever breaks with the tangible confi guration whereby parties and parts or lack of them 
are defi ned by a presupposition that, by defi nition, has no place in that confi guration—that of the 
part of those who have no part. Th is break is manifest in a series of actions that reconfi gure the 
space where parties, parts, or lack of parts have been defi ned… political activity is always a mode 
of expression that undoes the perceptible divisions of the police order by implementing a basically 
heterogenous assumption, that of a part of those who have no part, an assumption that, at the end 
of the day, itself demonstrates the sheer contingency of the order, the equality of any speaking being 
with any other speaking being. Politics occurs when there is a place and a way for two heterogenous 
processes to meet. Th e fi rst is the police process in the sense we have tried to defi ne. Th e second is 
the process of equality. 
Th us, politics always concerns those which Rancière identifi es as the part who have no part. In other 
words, those who in a social arrangement are placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy can, through their 
assertion of equality—both in word and in deed—disrupt the police order that excludes and marginalizes them. 
Th e heterogenous assumption of equality exposes the contingency of a particular police order, by showing that 
hierarchies are the product of history rather than the necessities of nature. If it is presupposed that everyone is 
equally intelligent, then it becomes clear that it is a matter of contingency if one group is higher in a hierarchy 
than other. Th is is often a diffi  cult idea to come to terms with since most police orders have tried to reinforce the 
notion that power should always be reserved to those few that somehow deserve it more than others. Th at is why 
Rancière (1999, 14) writes that: “[f ]rom Athens in the fi fth century B.C. up until our own governments, the party 
of the rich has only ever said one thing, which is most precisely the negation of politics: there is no part of those 
who have no part.” 
Two further aspects need to be highlighted at this point. Firstly, the purpose of politics under the assumption 
of equality is to declassify: “[t]he essence of equality is not so much to unify as to declassify, to undo the supposed 
naturalness of orders and replace it with the controversial fi gures of division” (Rancière 1995, 32-33). Th is means 
that the purpose of politics of equality should entail the rejection of a marginalized position to which one has been 
assigned, not for the sake of another and better position, but rather for the sake of nothing at all other than one’s 
equality (May 2008, 49). Preserving a particular label, or identity, will likely run the risk of either reinforcing the 
hierarchies established by the police, or establishing a new police order. Th us, politics can only be possible if the new 
collective subject cannot be identifi ed or named since “the name of an injured community that invokes its rights 
is always the name of the anonym, the name of anyone” (Rancière 1992, 60). Secondly, while a declassifi cation 
from the identities of the police order represents an important feature, this does not mean that a politics of equality 
does not also unify. In fact, such politics must necessarily unify, since it involves collective action. Th is collective 
action produces, in turn, a collective subject which Rancière (1999, 35) identifi es as a process of subjectifi cation: 
“[p]olitics is a matter of subjects or, rather, modes of subjectifi cation. By subjectifi cation I mean the production 
through a series of actions of a body and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifi able within a given fi eld 
of experience, whose identifi cation is thus part of the reconfi guration of the fi eld of experience.”
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According to this defi nition, subjectifi cation implies three distinct elements which need to be further 
elaborated. Firstly, as already suggested, subjectifi cation implies the emergence a collective subject or “body.” 
Th is means that before democratic action, there did not exist a ‘we,’ there existed only individuals going about 
their business. It is true that in some situations individuals may also act against a police order. However, their 
resistance will usually be driven by self-serving reasons. Such acts, therefore, are not political, since they do 
not strive for equality or for the betterment of the community. What is needed, therefore, in order for a ‘we’ to 
emerge and in order for political subjectifi cation to occur, is a group of individuals that come together under 
coordinated actions and enunciations. Th ese individuals need to act and speak as a whole, as members of a 
collective (May 2010, 47). A democratic politics, therefore, is a politics of the formations of subjects. Th is is 
what Rancière (1999, 11) means when he writes that “[p]olitics does not happen just because the poor oppose 
the rich. It is the other way around: politics (that is, the interruption of the simple eff ects of domination by the 
rich) causes the poor to exist as an entity.” 
Secondly, this collective subject, as Rancière explains, was something that was not “previously identifi able.” 
In other words, the ‘we’ that emerges through sayings and doings could not be initially identifi ed within the fi eld 
of social experience. To better understand this aspect, Rancière uses the example of the trial of the revolutionary 
Auguste Blanqui in 1832. When Blanqui was asked what his profession was, he replied that he was a proletarian. 
Th e magistrate, in turn, challenged Blanqui’s answer by saying that proletarian is not the name of a profession. 
Blanqui, in turn, responded that “[i]t is the profession of thirty million Frenchmen who live off  their labor 
and who are deprived of political rights” (Rancière 1999, 37). In this example, therefore, ‘proletarian’ serves to 
describe more than an individual worker. ‘Proletarian’ is a term that describes a collective subject, one which 
prior to political action was not identifi able. Th e individual workers became ‘proletarians’ only when they came 
together under the presupposition of equality. Women are a similar example to that of the proletarians. Normally, 
‘women’ is an identity that holds no mystery; everyone knows who and what is meant by it. However, political 
subjectifi cation challenges the obviousness of that who and what (Rancière 1999, 36). For example, the women 
who took part in the suff ragist movement were identifi ed for its duration not as individual women, but as a 
collective subject—as a group of women equal to men (May 2010, 48). It should also be pointed out here that 
political subjectifi cation does not work to assign a particular identity—even though it might assume a name that 
would seem to imply it. Th e element that brings people together to form a collective subject, whatever its name 
might be, is not a specifi c identity, but rather equality. In this sense, the term by which subjectifi cation goes is 
simply a placeholder (May 2010, 49).
Finally, the appearance of a collective subject that did not initially exist, causes a disruption in the fi eld of 
experience. Moreover, it allows for things to appear diff erently from the way they did before—in other words, 
it reconfi gures the partition of the sensible. Th us, going back to the previous example, when women presented 
themselves as equal to men, the fi eld of experience for both women and men changed. Th is presentation not 
only made men perceive women diff erently (perhaps as a threat), but women also saw themselves and thought 
of themselves diff erently—that is, as equals (May 2010, 49). Th at is why democratic action sets up communities 
that are “polemical” or “dissensual” communities, marked by “interruptions, fractures, irregular and local, through 
which egalitarian logic comes and divides the police community from itself.” Th ey emerge from “in-between 
spaces” or “intervals of subjectifi cation,” “constructed between identities, between spaces and places.” Th us 
“political being-together is being between: between identities, between worlds” (Rancière 1999, 137).
Th is type of politics, as the ones described above, is what defi nes democracy for Rancière. In fact, ‘true’ 
politics can only be democratic politics and Rancière (2010, 32) has been very clear on this point: “democracy is 
not a political regime in the sense that it forms one of the possible constitutions which defi ne the ways in which 
people assemble under a common authority. Democracy is the very institution of politics itself—of its subject 
and of the form of its relationship.” However, as indicated earlier, democratic politics happens very rarely, and 
when it does its purpose is no more than to “mobilize an obligation to hear” (Rancière 1995, 86). Th is means 
that democratic politics may or may not eff ect change. Whether those from the police order will be made to 
hear, whether they can be mobilized to hear, is an important question. What interests Rancière however, are not 
necessarily the consequences of politics, but rather how politics occurs through the presupposition of equality. 
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Indigenous Political Movements
Idle no More
As suggested in the previous section, politics concerns action that emerges from a framework of equality. Equality 
is not something that is received or distributed; rather equality is presupposed by those who decide to act against 
a political wrong. Th erefore, those who engage in political action do so not because they want to achieve equality, 
but rather because they assume to be the equal of everyone else who is part of their community. As Rancière 
(1998, 33) writes: “Equality is not a given that politics then presses into service, an essence embodied in the 
law or a goal politics sets itself the task of attaining. It is a mere assumption that needs to be discerned within 
the practices implementing it.” Th us, when people act in accordance with the democratic politics that Rancière 
describes, equality cannot be discerned as an end goal of politics, but rather as the animating assumption of 
those who engage in political action.
An important point can be drawn from the above quote, one which was not discussed in the previous 
section. Th ose who are engaged in political action might not be telling themselves in so many words that 
they are acting out of an assumption of equality. Equality, as a word, may not be mentioned at all during the 
unfolding of the movement. And indeed, when looking, for example, at the book Th e Winter We Danced: Voices 
from the Past, the Future, and the Idle No More Movement (a collection of essays published in the aftermath of 
INM), the word ‘equality’ never comes up in any of the essay titles. Equality, however, is assumed in titles such 
as We Are Free Human Beings or Nation to Nation Now. It is important therefore to highlight that equality is an 
assumption that does necessarily reveal itself in the thinking and in the organizing activities of those who act 
democratically (May 2010, 33). With this point in perspective, the paper will now turn to a discussion of INM 
in order to argue that what gave the movement its unique global character and allowed it to remain as open as 
possible to new, emergent forms of consciousness and lines of action was in fact the presupposition of equality 
that lies at the heart of democratic politics.  
Th e INM movement was initiated by an education campaign organized by four women in Saskatchewan, 
Sylvia McAdam, Jess Gordon, Nina Wilson, and Sheelah McLean. Under the label of INM, the original aim of 
the campaign was to provide information to members of Canadian communities about the impending impacts 
of the Canadian federal government’s proposed legislation, Bills C-38, and C-45 on Indigenous rights. Th ey 
raised particular concerns about eff ects on water and environmental protection, the use of First Nations land, 
and lack of consultation with First Peoples. Th is event coincided with Chief Th eresa Spence’s hunger strike, 
which inspired and galvanized the movement. Over the winter of 2012-13, protests spread through Canada 
and North America, allowing INM to become an international movement of resistance against colonial state 
practices. Tactics for these protests ranged from ‘fl ash mob’ round-dances and drumming in public places like 
shopping malls, street intersections, and legislature grounds to more direct forms of action, such as blockades 
and temporary train and traffi  c stoppages (Coulthard 2014, 160-161).
In the case of INM, equality was presupposed in several ways. Firstly, those who participated in INM 
showed a commitment to equality.  Th is is evident from the organization of INM. Although inspired by the 
initiatives of the four women, INM displayed a lack of hierarchy and formal leadership. In an interview, Sylvia 
McAdam claimed that “Idle No More has no leader. Th e founders might be considered guides for maintaining 
the vision, but Idle No More has no leader or offi  cial spokesperson” (Carlson 2013). Furthermore, as it evolved, 
INM actively sought to resist any leadership and maintain its ‘horizontal’ character. Mi’kmaq legal scholar 
Pamela Palmater has explained in an interview that “Idle No More is not led by any elected politician, national 
chief or paid executive director;” [i]t is a movement originally led by indigenous women and has been joined 
by grassroots First nations leaders, Canadians, and now the world” (Petrina 2013). Th us, INM rejected the 
temptation of dictating to people where their interests lie and how their struggle should unfold. Th is, of course, 
would have been contrary to democratic politics.  It is easy to understand then, that the horizontal character of 
INM would not have been possible without a general assumption of equality. By refusing any formal leadership, 
INM presupposed the equality of anyone with everyone. It presupposed that everyone was equally capable of 
participating in the political life of its community. Rancière (1999, 29-30) writes that democratic action assumes 
the “equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being.” INM displayed such equality through its 
decentralized character, which allowed a diversity of voices with a multitude of demands to emerge. Th e Kino-
nda-niimi Collective (2014, 23), in the introduction to Th e Winter We Danced, highlighted the equality of voices 
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among the INM participants by writing that: 
As it grew, the movement became broad-based, diverse, and included many voices. Th ere were 
those focused on the omnibus legislation, others who mobilized to protect the land and support 
the resurgence of Indigenous nations, some who demanded justice for the hundreds of missing 
and murdered Indigenous women, and still others who worked hard to educate and strengthen 
relationships with non-Indigenous allies.
Furthermore, equality was not only assumed among participants in the movement but also in relation to 
the Canadian state. Although most participants were in many respects a part of Canadian society that had no 
part, they did not accept the state’s refusal to give them a part in the discussion of Bill C-45 and C-38. Th ey did 
not make a plea to political representatives but instead acted with the assumption that everyone holds an equal 
part in the taking of political decisions such as those linked to Bill C-45 and C-38 that concern the community. 
In this way, INM exposed the hierarchies inherent in the Canadian political order and challenged its legitimacy.
Th e movement also disrupted the consensus formed around a social whole that sought to deny their equality. 
One way in which this disruption was produced was through the occupation of spaces. INM resorted to tactics 
such as blockades, traffi  c, and train stoppages (CBC 2013a). Th ese tactics culminated with a national day of 
protest on December 21, 2012, during which protesters temporarily blocked the entrance to Parliament Hill in 
Ottawa (CBC 2013b). Th e occupation of “in-between” spaces in the urban centers and economic areas played an 
important role in the movement’s impact. Th is is because it subverted the “normal distribution” of police spaces, 
“detourning” this spatial logic for political eff ect (Rancière 2006).
As explained in the previous section, the partition of the sensible is an essential element of the police order. 
Rancière suggests that the police partitions and distributes our sense experience of the world in a way that 
supports and reinforces the established hierarchies. However, if hierarchies operate at the level of the sensible, at 
the level of people’s experience of the world, then dissensus can operate there as well (May 2010, 24). Th us, the 
participants of INM, through their political actions, reconfi gured the fi eld of experience and revealed something 
that was not previously seen or heard within the police order. INM certainly became heard through social media 
and national and international media coverage (Th e Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014b, 25). It also became visible 
to the police order. For example, due to the disruption caused to the “police community,” (Rancière 1999, 137) 
the Prime Minister’s offi  ce saw itself forced to respond by calling a meeting with some of the informal leaders 
of INM (CBC 2013c). Moreover, it not only became visible and audible, but it also succeeded in appealing to 
various segments of the Canadian society, which began to see themselves as part of the collective subject (Denis 
2014, 217-218).  And thus what was not previously identifi able, became identifi ed as “a global movement with 
manifold demands” (Th e Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014b, 22).
By occupying spaces and challenging the police order through the assumption of equality, the participants in 
INM became part of a collective subject that did not previously exist. Rancière (1999, 35) writes that the subject 
that is produced by political action is one that is “not previously identifi able within a given fi eld of experience, 
whose identifi cation is thus part of the reconfi guration of the fi eld of experience.” Th is means that a subject 
appears, is produced, and occupies a place in the social whole that had formerly not existed. As it was often 
pointed out by those directly involved with the movement, the name of INM did not suggest that Indigenous 
peoples have been idle until then. Instead, INM simply represented the culmination of the anti-colonial struggle 
of Indigenous peoples (Th e Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014b, 21). However, what distinguished INM from 
other anti-colonial political events was that it allowed the emergence of a collective subject that was previously 
invisible. Th us, participation in INM (through democratic action) temporarily blurred the particular identities 
(a particular nation, race, or gender) of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people and instead allowed them to 
merge into a collectivity, a ‘we’ that was the ‘we’ of a divided people (Dean 2011). Th e assumption of equality 
allowed people of various backgrounds to see themselves in one another, and to intersect in a common front. 
As Judy Rebick has explained: INM “is a movement of a group of people with a common identity and despite 
the diff erent history and cultures of their nations, a common history in relation to Canada,” furthermore, INM 
is “better compared to the civil rights movement and women’s movement,” because, as Rebick (2014, 236) has 
noticed, the struggle concerns, fi rst and foremost, equality. Th us, protests carried under the banner of INM took 
on many of the characteristics of “insubstantial communities”—that is, communities that exist only in the act of 
their own verifi cation of equality (Rancière 1995, 84).
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Flash-mob round dances, as suggested earlier, represented a particular form of protests—one which became 
essential to the movement. Th e fi rst round-dance took place in a shopping mall in Regina, Saskatchewan, a few 
days after Bill C-45 became law. Indigenous activists began beating drums and singing and were soon joined 
by other people who joined hands to form a moving circle. In the next few months, the dance was repeated 
in hundreds of malls, intersections, highways, and reserves across the U.S. and Canada (Weir 2017, 31). Th is 
type of protest reinforced quite well the democratic elements of the movement as a whole. Th e round dances, 
just like the collectives formed in protest, unfolded within a framework of equality: Allison Weir noted that 
“[t] he round dances were multiethnic and multigenerational: people from diverse communities joined hands 
and moved in circles in support of First Nations communities” (31). Th us, the very act of coming together and 
dancing by holding hands suggested the emergence of a collective subject—a subject that was animated by the 
presupposition of equality. Furthermore, the dances occupied spaces that were considered part of the police 
logic, disrupting and eventually turning them into sites of democratic politics. Th e occupations of such spaces 
combined with an absence of any specifi c demands, allowed the people to distance themselves from consensual 
politics. Essentially, what the participants in the round dances sought to expose was the contradiction that 
existed between two worlds: the world in which they are equal, and the world in which they are not and in 
which there is only a pretense for equality (Rancière 1999, 27). Th e following phrase by Rancière perfectly 
summarizes the activity of the round-dancers: “[g]enuine participation is the invention of that unpredictable 
subject which momentarily occupies the street, the invention of a movement born of nothing but democracy 
itself…Th e test of democracy must ever be in democracy’s own image: versatile, sporadic—and founded on 
trust” (Rancière 1995, 61).
Towards the end of January of 2013, INM protests began to decline in intensity, allowing the media 
to suggest that movement’s purpose and eff ectiveness had deteriorated. Moreover, INM did not prevent Bill 
C-45 (the omnibus bill that gave rise to the movement) from becoming law (Coulthard 2014, 165). Th e lack of 
any signifi cant political changes might represent a reason to suggest that INM failed as a political movement. 
However, this outcome was more or less predictable. Th e movement arose from below, from that part that 
usually did not have any part, that part that was placed at the bottom of the hierarchy. Th e chances, therefore, 
of eff ecting real political change were always small, since INM developed in resistance to a police order that 
had already monopolized most of the political resources. From a Rancièrean perspective however, INM did not 
fail because the very existence of the movement disrupted the partition or distribution of the sensible. Rancière 
(1995, 86) writes that a democratic politics “causes equality to have a real social eff ect, only when it mobilizes 
an obligation to hear.” From this standpoint, INM certainly mobilized under the assumption of equality. Ken 
Coates (2015) observed that: “Idle No More sought no singular or technical outcome... It was more about 
community building, about fi nding both common cause and a shared voice.” At the same time, it also created an 
obligation to hear. Th is can be observed in Coulthard’s (2014, 165) comments:
Indeed, the recent escalation and increased public visibility of Indigenous anti-fracking protests 
in places like Elsipotog, New Brunswick, along with the anti-oil sands activism led by Native 
communities in northern Alberta, and the unrelenting antipipepline campaigns mounted by First 
Nations communities across British Columbia, are a clear demonstration of Indigenous peoples’ 
continued resolve to defend their land and sovereignty from further encroachments by the state 
and capital.
More often than not, politics does not go beyond dissensus—if it would, it would betray the democratic 
character that Rancière has posited. Th is is because, as suggested in the previous section, the success of democratic 
politics does not depend on the reactions of those within the police order. If it would be otherwise, then the 
existence of democratic politics would become contingent on the response of those who seek to deny equality 
and implicitly democracy. Th erefore, the assumption of equality, as the animating condition of politics, ensures 
that the existence or non-existence of democracy lies in the hands of those who struggle, rather than in those 
of the elite (May 2010).
Dakota Access Pipeline Protests 
Th e Dakota Access Pipeline is a project that was started in December 2014 with the intention of transporting 
crude oil from North Dakota to Illinois. Th e actors involved in the construction of the pipeline had planned 
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to have it cross under the Missouri river and over cultural lands that belong to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
(SRST). Th e Standing Rock Sioux presented the argument that they have not been suffi  ciently consulted on 
the DAPL project and that a possible completion of the pipeline will have two important negative implications: 
1) the pipeline will pose a contamination threat to the tribe’s main source of water, since it will pass under the 
Missouri river, within half a mile upstream of the tribe’s reservation; 2) the pipeline will traverse areas of cultural 
signifi cance, such as sacred sites and burial grounds, which the tribe seeks to protect. In reaction to the overall 
decision, the tribe has sued the government body involved in the issuance of the construction permits. Th e 
decisions behind the construction of this pipeline soon sparked protests from the local tribe members, who, in 
the summer of 2016, set up a camp on the pipeline’s construction grounds. Within a short time, the camp grew 
to number a few thousand participants, sparking solidarity at both a national and an international level. Such 
solidarity allowed protests to continue throughout the remainder of the year (Sammon 2016). As it will be 
explained in the following paragraphs, a closer look at this political situation reveals a number of elements that 
belong to the form of radical democratic politics that Rancière has imagined. 
At fi rst sight, it seems that this political situation revolves around Indigenous rights and sovereignty. 
For example, in one of the statements given by a representative of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, it was 
observed that “it is time the United States fi nally and consistent with its legal and international obligations 
fully recognize our right to be treated like human beings and as sovereign nations” (Stand with Standing 
Rock 2016a). However, a closer look reveals that there is a transition from a claim to Indigenous identity to 
one for universal equality. Th e request to be treated like human beings and sovereign nations is based on a 
presupposition of equality. Th is is so because if some would willfully accept that they are less human and less 
sovereign than others, then they would do so because inequality—rather than equality—would be assumed. 
Furthermore, images in the media which captured protesters holding a feather in their hand while being met 
by armed police offi  cers put forward a similar message: ‘despite the disproportion in power, we stand in front of 
you as equals, as human beings (Patinkin 2016).’
And in another statement, the claim for universal equality was even more clear: “in honor of our future 
generations, we fi ght this pipeline to protect our water, our sacred places, and all living beings.” Th is type of 
statement is what Rancière (2006) has referred to as a “political proposition”—meaning a situation “when 
people are able to think not only for themselves, but for anybody.”  Th erefore, rather than taking on a struggle 
that exclusively concerned the members of the tribe, the Sioux at Standing Rock instead took on a struggle 
that focused on the equality of every human being. Th is approach allowed them to address not only local 
issues but also issues that possibly aff ected everyone on the planet—such as the environment (Carasik 2016). 
Th e expression ‘all livings beings’ served as an invitation for all those who were at the wrong end of the police 
hierarchy, an invitation for people to see themselves in one another and to act on behalf of the equality that 
others were seeking to deny. 
As a result, the protesters appeared not as a particular tribe, but as a people (a demos) standing together 
to resist the imposed hierarchies. In Rancier’s terms, what emerged was a ‘polemical’ political community, one 
that was not anticipated by the police. Th us, although the SRST were the ones who initiated the protests, they 
were soon followed by other groups who were neither Indigenous, nor local. For example, the SRST’s demand 
for equality also attracted the support of environmental groups—with the most notable being Earthjustice, a 
legal organization that off ered pro bono representation (Earthjustice 2016). Moreover, approximately 2000 US 
military joined the protests in North Dakota, (CBC 2016a) while in Manitoba large groups of protesters took 
to the streets of Winnipeg (CBC 2016b).
As mentioned earlier, political subjectifi cation is produced through a series of actions and enunciations. 
Th us, the participants at Standing Rock not only assumed equality by enunciating it but also by acting upon it. 
By occupying spaces (such as the pipeline’s construction site, or major city streets) that were within police control, 
the protesters turned these spaces into sites of democratic politics. Th e very fact that people came together on a 
day by day basis demonstrated that the spaces had become spaces of equality. And by detourning those spaces 
for political eff ect, the protesters exposed the contradiction of what Rancière (1999,116) has identifi ed as “two 
worlds in a single world:” the world where they count as members of a society, and the world where they are not 
acknowledged; the world where they can participate in politics and be heard as speaking beings, and the world 
where their presence and their voice is reduced to mere noise. 
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Moreover, the collective subject brought a rearrangement of the partition or division of the sensible 
through the identifi cation of something that had previously been invisible. Rancière (1995, 48) presented the 
claim that “[t]his is the defi nition of a struggle for equality which can never be merely a demand upon the 
other, nor a pressure put on him, but always simultaneously a proof given to oneself. Th is is what ‘emancipation’ 
means.” Th e events at Standing Rock were in many ways an emancipation for the participants. Th is is because 
the emergent collective subject allowed those involved to see themselves and their worlds diff erently—that is, 
it allowed them to see politics not in terms of their inferiority but in terms of their equality. Th ose who faced 
armed police offi  cers with feathers in their hand were a clear proof of that emergent political attitude. Viewed 
from this perspective, therefore, the protesters’ fi eld of experience changed because they began to think and act 
as an equal people. 
Furthermore, the partition of the sensible changed not only for the protesters but also for the police order. 
It can be argued that the ‘we’ that was not there before managed to disrupt the normal distribution of police 
spaces because it emerged in those “in-between” spaces that were initially within the control of the police. Th e 
attempts to remove the protesters from their initial space and relocate them to a more ‘organized’ one—one 
which was identifi ed as a ‘free speech zone—’ clearly revealed a confl ict over the logic of police spaces (Stand 
with Standing Rock 2016b). By disputing these spaces, the protesters also exposed the weakness of the general 
order of the police, who—in its attempt to restore consensus—has resorted to high numbers of military police 
offi  cers (Democracy Now 2016).
Just like in the case of INM, the democratic politics at Standing Rock had caused an “obligation to hear.” 
Th is is evident from the behavior of the police, who through its government bodies not only temporarily halted 
the construction of the pipeline, but also acknowledged that “this case has highlighted the need for a serious 
discussion on whether there should be nationwide reform with respect to considering tribes’ views on these 
types of infrastructure projects” (Th e United States Department of Justice 2016). However, despite the fact that 
the call for a serious discussion was heard, the protests have recently faded away. And on top of this, DAPL has 
recently become fully operational (Stand with Standing Rock 2017).
How, therefore, can these outcomes be interpreted? As previously mentioned, Rancière (1999, 31) is quite 
sober when it comes to democratic politics. Politics is always contingent on a police order, “doesn’t always 
happen—it actually happens very little or rarely.” Th us, democratic politics, as presented by Rancière, cannot 
off er a recipe for social change; what it can off er instead, is a framework through which we can understand 
and practice democratic action. Th e strength of such democratic politics lies precisely in the fact that it is 
indeterminate, since one cannot know where and how it will emerge. It is this indeterminacy, that gives strength 
to politics that mobilizes our equal capacity as humans (Magnusson 2015, 190).
Conclusion
Both INM and the protests at Standing Rock were shown to exemplify the democratic elements that  Ranciè re 
has envisioned: the presupposition of equality, subjectifi cation, and dissensus from the current police order. It 
is these elements that allow Ranciè re’s account of democracy to become useful for thinking and practicing of 
contemporary political movements. As Jean-Philippe Deranty (2010, 183) has noticed, what makes Ranciè re’s 
thought so appealing, is the fact that it not only takes “political emancipation as its object of study but aims to 
participate practically in emancipation.”
As such, there is, fi rst of all, an aesthetic dimension to the creation of cases of equality. Th is is because it 
is at the level of sense experience that the police order operates those implicit decisions about who is included 
and in what way, and whose voice counts in politics. As it has been discussed, Ranciè re describes the police as 
a more complex form of governmentality1, therefore, the activity of politics must go beyond the institutional 
level, and must, fi rst and foremost, focus on contesting the police distribution of the sensible. In other words, 
a collective struggle cannot be satisfi ed with simply negotiating for a better position within a police order (in 
this sense legal reforms or media recognition cannot suffi  ce). For it to be successful, it must produce dissensus 
— i.e. it must altogether challenge the hierarchical and exclusionary distributions of the police and must create 
new spaces and new capacities in which equality can be attested. From this perspective, INM and the DAPL 
protests were able to challenge the police logic of places such as private lands and urban spaces (shopping malls 
and road intersections) by asking whether these are in fact democratic spaces. Such contestations revealed  that 
government decisions such as the construction of pipelines were in fact matters of public concern. (Tanke, 62) 
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Th us, both case studies discussed were successful because they were able to question what it means to be a 
political subject, as well as what is a legitimate object of political discussion.
Th e two case studies also revealed that thinking and practicing political struggles in terms of equality puts 
a clear emphasis on solidarity because it opens up the possibility not only for an excluded group to be heard but 
also a space for those allotted a part to work on behalf of equality. Such solidarity, goes of course, by the name of 
subjectifi cation—i.e. the process by which the part of those without a part struggle, in spite of their diff erences, 
to constitute themselves as a political subject. Even though collective struggles can sometimes develop without 
the presupposition of equality, the divisions that exist between people who occupy diff erent positions in the 
police order usually prevent the kind of solidarity that would form the basis of meaningful resistance. Th at is why, 
without a driving assumption for equality, a collective struggle cannot often be more than an alliance between 
those whose individual interests fi nd a temporary convergence. In order for a struggle to bind people together 
into a large democratic movement, there needs to be a strong sense of commonality among its members. Th is 
commonality does not require that everyone be the same—since the real diff erences that exist between people 
cannot be eff aced—but rather that everyone sees himself or herself in connection with others (May 2010, 147). 
As it was argued in the previous section, subjectifi cation—by way of the presupposition of equality—is of 
suffi  cient generality to make such a connection. Once this presupposition disappears, then so does the incentive 
to progress from a local struggle to the type of mass resistance that INM or the DAPL protests achieved.
From what has been discussed so far, equality is clearly the central aspect of Ranciè re’s theory. His focus 
on this principle might seem trivial as it has been the focus of discussion among social and political thinkers 
for several centuries—that is why equality is now a fundamental principle of western democracy, embedded 
within most of its political institutions and practices. However, equality for Ranciè re is neither something to be 
taken for granted once it has been inscribed within the trajectory of western political thought, nor a timeless, a 
priori principle to which institutions can appeal. Rather, equality must be continually verifi ed and demonstrated 
through the speech and political action of a collective subject. It is this reliance upon its own demonstration that 
greatly expands the potential of this principle. 
Th e uniqueness of equality therefore, as described by Ranciè re, lies in the scope of its application, in the fact 
that there are no limits to its reach. Th e empty freedom which everyone possesses brings to light the collective 
power that can be assumed by those without a voice in the world. It unites those thought to be dissimilar in 
a fundamental rejection of identitarian police logic and the affi  rmation of a community that has been fairly 
counted and organized. Th e part without a part, be it the refugees, the workers, the women, the colonized, or the 
LGBTQ, through the assertion of equality, expose the world that has been established through their exclusion 
(Tanke 2011, 70-72). Th e political task, therefore, is to continually challenge our institutions, practices, and 
discourses, as Ranciè re writes, countering them by way of equality remains the “most untimely/excessive of 
exercises” (Ranciè re 2007, 342).
Notes
1  Several political theorists have suggested that settler colonialism is a form of governmentality. See for ex-
ample: Alfred 2009; Simpson 2011; Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel 2014.
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